02.23.12

Cyberwar & the Insubstantial Blues

Posted in Cyberterrorism at 2:49 pm by George Smith

From the Google news tab today, a bit on cyberwar from National Defense magazine, a trade pub no one reads except war profiteers and those readying themselves for a career in the same while in service to the government. In other words, a mag for the revolving door biz.

Entitled “What If There Were a Cyberwar and Nobody Knew About it?” — it actually looks to date from 2009, initially as a news piece on Martin Libicki’s Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar.

Financed by the Air Force and published through the Bland Corporation RAND, the book was a working example of the insubstantiali nature of the cyberwar argument.

Three years old, it still has nothing to hang its hat on except the advent of Stuxnet.

Cyberwar hasn’t shown up in any big way in the intervening three years although you wouldn’t know it from reading the US press. Still, by contrast with what passes for discussion today, the book was cautious for its time.

Some standard lines, excerpted, the kind that everyone repeats so they can have a career in the national security apparatus:

Another reason why the public may not be informed of a cyberwar is the risk that a third party could insert itself into the conflict. If the United States and China were engaged in such a war, for example, a hacker — someone sitting on a couch in a basement somewhere — or a third nation interested in seeing a prolonged conflict, could surreptitiously launch computer assaults and escalate the war.

“An exchange of cyber-attacks between states may also excite the general interest of superpatriot hackers or those who like to dogpile — particularly if the victim of the attack or the victim of retaliation, or both, are unpopular in certain circles,??? Libicki wrote in the book, which was commissioned by the Air Force. The two adversaries may blame each other for the attacks, and not be aware that they are being manipulated.


So how good is the United States [at cyberwar]? It’s cyber-offense capabilities have been largely kept out of the public eye. Libicki didn’t want to reveal much in a nonclassified setting, saying only that, “We’re really good. … In fact, I think we’re better than anybody else. We’re also very professional about this. The state of our tradecraft is very good.???

None of this is new. The US has been said to be the best at cyberwar for years. It can’t be helped. Even though there’s no metric, people who work within the system are expected to brag about the skill of it.

We’re always the best at everything, particularly when your future prospects depend upon you saying so.

And one can see hanging consequences on hackers, for something say — that theoretically might happen between the US and the many cyber-enemies, like China, has been talked about for awhile.

If you download the book — RAND makes it available free in .pdf (no link, easy enough to Google), the paucity of old material on which to base a discussion becomes apparent.

There are, naturally, no instances of the power grid being interrupted, no examples of water being poisoned or corrupted, no examples of the financial system being subvert, now the big laugher in the bunch.

There are eight instances of the word “blackout,” none of them linked to anything actual, although one does find in the footnotes the old media stories, since evaporated into ephemera, which originally claimed otherwise.

Two examples, again neither amounting to much and quickly disregarded are seen: the Slammer worm, which some reporters tried to tie to the Northeast blackout in 2003. The news piece cited was written by a journalist I once shared a stage with at the Cato Institute.

His record since has not been good.

The other bit is a story about Chinese hacking of the power grid, pumped by Shane Harris at the National Journal, and a subsequent alleged blackout in Florida — an incident virtually no one believes.

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